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FURNISHINGS; EDWARDS FURNITURE, INC., a corporation;
ELDREDGE FURNITURE CO., INC.,
a corporation; EARL'S HOME FURNISHINGS, INC., a corporation;
LAKEWOODS HOME FURNISHINGS, INC., a corporation; MAYER
SEGAL; TRIBE'S HOME FURNITURE & CARPET CO., INC., a corporation; VAN KAMPEN & SONS,
INC., a corporation; WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION,
a corporation; WILLIAM DAVIS, dba
DAVIS FURNITURE COMPANY;
and PRICE TRADING CO., a corporat lon >

>

Case No.
13640

Plaintiff-Appellants,

vs.
WILLIAM EMMEL dba NOYCE
TRANSFER & WAREHOUSE CO.,
Defenckmt-Respo'ttdent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action filed by the plaintiffs above named
against the defendant, William Emmel, doing business
as Noyce Transfer & Warehouse Company for damages
1
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allegedly sustained to plaintiffs' goods stored in defendant's warehouse and destroyed in a fire on July 24,1972.
All of the plaintiffs set forth in their complaint a cause
of action based in negligence on the part of the defendant
as a warehouseman, claiming that the defendant was
negligent in the operation of his warehouse and was responsible for their loss. Three of the plaintiffs, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Eldredge Furniture Company, Inc., and Mayer Segal, amended their complaint
to also assert a claim that defendant was a common
carrier with respect to them in addition to his status as
a warehouseman and as a common carrier was liable to
those plaintiffs without regard to negligence.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the end of the evidence, both the plaintiffs and
the defendant moved the trial court for a determination
as to the legal status of the defendant with respect to
the three plaintiffs asserting the claim of common carrier
relationship. The trial court found that the defendant
was in the status of a common carrier with respect to
plaintiff, Eldredge Furniture Company, Inc v and directed judgment on Eldredge's claim in the amount of
$1,083.46 together with interest and plaintiff's costs.
As to the plaintiff Westinghouse Electric Corporation
and Mayer Segal, the court found that no relationship
of common carrier existed and that the testimony elicited
from both parties showed the legal status between the
plaintiffs and the defendant to be one of warehouseman or bailee.
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The trial court submitted the question of negligence
) the jury for all plaintiffs with the exception of Eldedge Furniture Company, Inc. for whom a verdict was
irected. The jury returned a special verdict finding
he defendant was free from negligence in the operation
•f his warehouse. Plaintiff, Eldredge Furniture Com)any, does not join in this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant/Respondent, William Emmel, requests
this court affirm the trial court's ruling as to the common carrier relationship issue between Westinghouse
and the defendant and affirm the judgment of no cause
of action entered by the trial court upon the jury's finding of no negligence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs' statement of facts generally represents
the trial proceedings, but should be supplemented as
follows.
The defendant, William Emmel, provided three
separate services for his customers. First, he unloaded
the arriving goods from pooled railroad cars which had
been forwarded by other agencies to the defendant for
storage or further distribution. Second, prior to any
further action, the defendant stored these goods in his
warehouse. And, third, for some customers, delivered
goods within his area of authority granted by the Public Service Commission (R. 180, 181 & 182).

3
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With respect to the plaintiff, Westinghouse, defendant testified that his procedure with Westinghouse when
the consignees were contractors was to always call them
to insure that they could accept delivery before he in
fact delivered (B. 251 & 252). Mr. Emmel testified that
on prior occasions he had attempted to make deliveries
and found that he could not make delivery and accordingly, he would contact the consignee, to whom the Westinghouse goods were to be delivered, to insure that
everything was ready before he took the goods out (B.
252). Mr. Emmel also testified that prior to 1972, there
had been occasions where he had had to hold Westinghouse's goods for an inordinate length of time before
the consignee could accept the goods and had to charge
them extra storage (B. 252).
The defendant's warehouse, which was destroyed by
fire, was locked and checked by Mr. Emmel prior to his
departure on the Friday before the fire. All electrical
appliances and lights, with the exception of one night
light, were off (B. 244). No highly flammable goods or
liquids were stored in the building over the weekend with
the exception of one five gallon gasoline can stored near
the front of the building which was not burned by the
fire. The building was free from trash and accumulation of debris on the Friday before the fire (B. 234 &
245).

>,.,:: ..V,
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The fire department inspector, Dean Callister, did
not testify as suggested by the appellant in his statement of facts, at page 4, that the point of origin of the
fire was the electrical switch boxes. In fact, Mr. Callister
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istified that the fire appeared to have burned up in
a area in which the electrical switch boxes were located
R. 211). The fire burned up from the floor at the point
f origin (R. 211) and the electrical switch boxes were
>cated on the wall (R. 211), at a height of approximately
ix feet (R. 290). The appellants' suggestion that the
ire's point of origin was in the electrical switch boxes,
jid so testified to by Fire Department Inspector Calliser, is not supported by the record of Inspector Callis;er's testimony. Inspector Callister testified that the
mise of the fire was undetermined (R. 216). He did
lot testify that the cause of the fire was an electrical
failure.
The fire department examined the electrical fuse
boxes that were removed by it to the fire department
office by the Fire Chief (R. 217). The fire department also investigated an electrical air conditioner at
the scene of the fire (R. 218), noting that the wiring to
the air conditioner as well as the wiring in the warehouse
in general was contained in conduit (R. 219 & 217).
As far as the fire department was concerned, Mr.
Emmel's maintenance of his warehouse was not a cause
of the fire (R. 211) and the defendant was complying
with all fire department requirements and regulations
prior to the fire (R. 215 & 216). The fire department
made yearly inspections of Mr. Emmel's warehouse and
the department investigator Dean Callister, testified
that Mr. Emmel was complying with the safety standards
required by the yearly inspection (R. 212 & 215).

5
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City Electrical Inspector Chidester was unable to
state that a faulty electrical system caused the fire on
July 24, 1972, (R. 348), and was also unable to state
that the fuse in which copper wire had been inserted
rather than the normal fuse link caused the fire complained of by the plaintiffs (R.342). Chidester also noted
that the master switch panel in which the allegedly defective fuses were maintained was an added extra precaution that was not necessary under city requirements
(R. 347, 348 & 388). Chidester was not in a position to
say that the substitute copper wire in the fuses would
"blow" faster or slower than regular fuse links (R. 345).
Plaintiffs offered evidence consisting of a new fuse
similar to the one, at least in size, that was contained in
the master switch box prior to the fire (Exhibit 30-p).
It was noted that to inspect the fuse element one would
have to shut off all the electrical power to the building,
remove the fuse and unscrew the fuse end before the
fuse link could be examined (R. 345, Exhibit 30-p).
Defendant Emmel and his foreman, Grant Bartlett,
testified that no fuse had been replaced by them, nor
had a fuse ever been blown (R. 239, 240 & 291); and that
there were no electrical problems or changes since the
defendant bought the building (R. 239, 291 & 292) in
1969. Defendant's foreman was aware of no electrical
problems in the fuse box either before or after the defendant purchased the building from Jack Noyce in 1969
and could recall only one occasion when the air conditioner tripped one of the breaker switches on the breaker
panel (R. 291). The braker panel of switches provided
$
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, 15 to 20 amp, safety capacity on the line prior to the
aain switch box and the copper link fuses (R. 392).
Two electrical engineers were called, Mr. Fackrell
or the plaintiff and Mr. Bates for the defendant. Both
hese engineers testified concerning their observations
ind conclusions, particularly as to the fuses and their
copper wire fuse links. Appellant states on page 5 of
lis brief in the Statement of Facts that his expert testified that No. 18 wire in the fuses could cause the No. 8
vire outside the main switch box to burn the result in
i fire. Respondent suggests that Mr. Fackrell did not
state that a hot No. 8 wire would start a fire, but rather
that he had made no tests to determine whether the wire
got hot enough to even start cardboard on fire (R. 369).
Both Mr. Fackrell and Mr. Bates, defendant's electrical engineer, agreed that the copper wires in the fuses
blew as would any fuse link. They disagreed on the
time that would be required or the amount of amperage
crossing the wires for such an occurrence to take place.
Mr. Fackrell could not say whether the fire caused a
fault in the system out beyond the main switch box which
created an overload and "blew" the copper wires in the
fuses or whether there was a fault in the system and the
copper wires got hot enough to start the fire (R. 371
& 373).
Mr. Bates was of the opinion, after a question put
to him by defendant's counsel, which contained the testimony as to the condition of the building, the condition
of the wiring and the condition of the appliances in the
building at the time of the fire, that the fire was not of
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electrical origin, but rather the copper wire in the fuses
in question "blew" when the fire itself caused the electrical system to short (B. 395 & 396).
: The trial court on plaintiffs' motion for new t r i a l
on the basis of newly discovered evidence, found that the
offered evidence did not comply with Rule 59 (a) (4)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the plaintiff did
not show that the newly discovered evidence could not
have been obtained with reasonable diligence or discovered prior to trial. Apparently, Mr. Jack Noyce, would
have been called to testify that the fuses were never
improvised during the time he owned the business, that
information coming from an affidavit produced by one
of the plaintiffs, Dale R. Holbrook, of Lakewood Home
Furnishings, Inc., (R. 22). There was no showing to
the trial judge on the motion that plaintiffs had ever
attempted to contact Mr. Noyce prior to the trial or
subpoena him for the trial or that such evidence would
have had any material effect on the outcome of the
trial (R. 20).
POINT I.
DEFENDANT WAS A WAREHOUSEMAN
AS TO ALL PLAINTIFFS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ELDREDGE FURNITURE
COMPANY, INC., AND DID NOT STAND IN
THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP OF COMMON
CARRIER TO WESTINGHOUSE,
The trial court ruled, that of the three plaintiffs
claiming that defendant was a common carrier in relation
to them, only Eldredge Furniture Company, Inc. and the
8
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efendant were in that legal relationship. The court found
hat the course of dealing as evidenced by the testimony
rom both Mr. Whittemore, the operations manager for
Westinghouse, and Mr. Emmel, the defendant, did not
create the legal status of common carrier (See trial
court's ruling, R. 406, 407 & 408).
At the time of the fire, it is defendant's position
uhat he was in the capacity of a warehouseman in his
relationship with the plaintiff Westinghouse and that
the course of dealing between Westinghouse, the defendant, and the ultimate consignees of Westinghouse directed the trial court to such a conclusion.
Plaintiff, Eldredge, testified that separate charges
were made for each service (R, 181 & 182), and Mr.
Emmel testified that he received Westinghouse's goods,
stored them in his warehouse until delivery was requested by the consignees (R. 251 & 252). The course of dealings which had been established prior to the fire with
respect to Westinghouse's goods was that the goods would
be unloaded and stored in the warehouse and held there
until such time as the consignee or ultimate purchaser
requested the defendant make delivery. There were
even times when Westinghouse's goods were delayed so
long in the warehouse th^t Mr. Emmel made additional
storage charges (R. 252).
Even plaintiff Westinghouse's operations manager,
Mr. Edward C. Whittemore, testified thftt Mr. Emmel
would contact the contractor to find out if he was ready
for them and if the contractor was able to take Westing-'
0
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house's merchandise, Mr. Emmel would deliver it, If
they were not ready, Mr. Emmel would hold the goods
until the ultimate purchaser could handle it. Mr. Whittemore testified as follows (E, 193, lines 1-30 & 194, lines
1-8):
Q. What if they are not ready for them? [The
goods]
A. That's when Mr. Emmel would contact the
contractor and find out if he was ready for
them. Why then, he would deliver them.
Q. But if they weren't ready, he would not deliver
them ? He would hold them until the ultimate
purchaser could handle it?
A. That is right.
Q. Now, do you know whether or not Mr. Emmel
shipped any of these goods out of his warehouse? I am not talking about these goods.
Obviously, these goods were not shipped anywhere. Prior to this time. In trying to establish a procedure that had been going on,
business relationship between your company
and Mr. EmmePs company, do you know
whether or not Mr. Emmel contacted these
contract purchasers before making any shipments?
A. Yes.. ,.
Q. As a matter of course?
A. Yes.
Q. In other words, they would not come into his
warehouse. He would unload them on his
truck and drive on out?
A. No, I would say not.
10
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Q. Because he would get out there and find out
they couldn't use them and bring them back?
A. That is right.
Q. With respect to these, you do not know
whether these contractors were ready to take
this equipment on the day they came in his
warehouse or not? You have no information
concerning that?
.

A. Only by what Mr. Emmel said.
Q. What did Mr. Emmel say?
A. He said he contacted one of our dealers there.
Q. Who is "one of our dealers""
A. I am not sure whether it is Don Christensen
or Showcase Homes.
Q. Do you know?
A. No, I don't. They said that is where he was,
either debating to unload the railroad car or
not.

Mr. Emmel testified that it was the general procedure with Weistinghouse goods to insure that delivery
could be accomplished and that he contacted the ultimate
consignee prior to delivery (K. 251).
In attempting to determine whether or not the course
of dealings between the defendant and the plaintiff,
Westinghouse, created the legal status of common carrier, the respondent would direct the Court's attention
to 13 AmJur 2d 762, § 255. It will be noted that for the
status of common carrier to attach to a relationship between two parties there must be immediate transportation and a delay for the earner's convenience.
11
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A completed delivery to the carrier of the property to be transported is necessary to establish
the legal relation of carrier and shipper. When
such a delivery had been made to, and accepted
by, the carrier, the liability of the common carrier
commences eo instanti. The fact that the goods
which are delivered for immediate transportation
are detained at the carrier^ warehouse pending
the arrival of a vehicle on which to ship them, or
for the carrier's temporary convenience, does not
prevent the carrier becoming liable as such or
reduce its liability to that of a warehouseman
only. In such case, the deposit is a mere accessory to the carriage and does not postpone the
commencement of its liability as a common carrier
to the time when they are actually put in motion
towards the place of their destination. However,
where there is no completed delivery and acceptance of the goods, the carrier, despite the custody
of the goods, is liable only as a warehouseman
therefore in the absences of any contract, expressed or implied, to the contrary. (Emphasis
added)
The criteria in establishing the general responsibility of a carrier requires first that the goods are being
delivered to the warehouse for immediate transportation and if they are detained in the carrier's warehouse,
that the delay be for the convenience of the carrier and
not that of the shipper or ultimate consignee. In, the
case of Westinghouse's goods, they were not placed with
the defendant for immediate transportation and they were
not detained in the defendant's warehouse for the defendant's convenience but rather for the convenience of
the ultimate consignee or purchaser. It will be recalled

n
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:hat Mr. Whittemore testified as well as Mr; Emmel
that the procedure was that Mr. Emmel would call to
insure that delivery could be accomplished and if for
some reason it could not, the goods would be retained
in the warehouse until such time as the consignee could
take them. Therefore, it does not appear that the goods
were placed with the defendant for immediate transportation, but on the contrary, placed with him for transportation when it could be accepted by the consignee
and that it was not the defendant's convenience that was
being served by the retention of the goods in the warehouse, but the convenience of the ultimate consignee.
The appellants cite to the Court cases involving
forwarders indicating that this is a similar arrangement
to defendant's business. Forwarders, as opposed to
warehousemen, collect goods from various shippers and
make up either truckloads or rail carloads of goods to a
similar destination. The respondent was not in the business of assembling merchandise or property from various sources to make up a carload and ship them to a
common destination, but rather his business was disassembly of a carload which had been made up by some
forwarder of various property to store in his warehouse
for either pickup or delivery as requested. The respondent submits that oases holding that a forwarder is a
carrier have no application to the case on appeal before
this Court.
This Court has recognized and accepted the proposition that a business venture may deal in one legal
13
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status with a customer at one time and another legal
status with the same customer at another time. Representative of that case is Allen vs. Southern Pacific Company,
117 Utah 171, 213 P2d 667 (1950). In that case, the plaintiff, Frank J. Allen brought an action against Southern
Pacific Company to recover $2,190.00 for a traveling bag
and contents which were lost from the Southern Pacific
Company's checkroom in the railroad station. One part
of the appeal considered whether or not a railroad,
which held itself out to be a carrier, in maintaining a
checkroom at their check station was acting in the capacity of a warehouseman rather than a common carrier.
This Court held that in maintaining a checkroom to
store plaintiff's goods while it was being readied for an
interstate journey, the railroad was acting as a warehouseman rather than a common carrier. The court
stated:
A checkroom business is no part of the business
of the common carrier and when it acts in that
capacity, it is acting as a warehouseman.
This Court, in Allen vs. Southern Pacific Company,
supra., recognized the fact that a carrier as to the storage of goods can be considered a warehouseman and can
be acting in a dual capacity of carrier and warehouseman.
Appellant, in his brief on page 20, attempts to distinguish Allen vs. Southern Pacific Company, supra.,
stating that a separate payment for checkroom service
was charged in Allen vs. Southern Pacific Company,

14
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supra., indicating that a separate charge is not the custom in the instant case. It will be recalled that plaintiff,
Eldredge, testified that there was a separate charge for
delivery. Other state jurisdictions have held that a
common carrier can become a warehouseman under circumstances where the carrier undertakes to store the
shipper's goods and the standard of care that attache
to the carrier under those circumstances, is a standard
of care required of a warehouseman. In these cases,
the carriers held themselves out to be carriers and not
warehousemen as opposed to the instant situation where
the defendant holds himself out to be a warehouseman
as to plaintiff Westinghouse's goods and not a carrier
at the time of the fire.
Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument, that the defendant as to Westinghouse was in the
status of carrier, the facts and situations surrounding
delivery and the manner in which they were delivered
would take the defendant out of the status of carrier and
place him into the status of a warehouseman, as suggested by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen vs. Southern
Pacific Company, supra. The general rule as applied
in these other jurisdictions is well stated in 13 AmJur
2d, Carriers, §404, page 887.
SECTION 404. GOODS RETAINED AT THE
REQUEST OF CONSIGNEE.
Where goods have arrived at their destination, and at the request and for the convenience
of the consignee are allowed to remain in the
custody of the carrier, its liability as an insurer
15
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of the goods ceases and becomes thereafter that
of a warehouseman or a depository.
. . . Moreover, where common carriers have consented without additional compensation to retain
the further custody of freight for the owner's
accommodation and at his special request, it has
been held that their liability as common carrier
ceases and thereafter, they are liable only as
gratuitous bailees or depositories, bound to use
good faith but, having done so, liable for loss only
in case of gross neglect, unless they have entered
into some special engagement relative thereto
which indicates the degree of responsibility they
are to sustain, or have subsequent to the arrival of
the freight contracted for and storage for hire,
in which they are bound to use ordinary diligence
and are liable for loss by ordinary neglect.
Representative of that position is the case of Bailway Express Agency vs. Schoen, 70 Ariz. 87, 216 P2d
420 (1950). That case included an action by plaintiff
Schoen against Railway Express Agency for damage to
a shipment of costume jewelry which had been transported by a common carrier and stored in the common
carrier's warehouse at the request of the plaintiff until
final shipment could be made. The Supreme Court of
Arizona held that when the goods have arrived at their
destination and remain in the custody of the common
carrier in accordance with a request by the consignee, the
carrier holds those goods as a warehouseman and its
liability must be determined under the law of a ware^
houseman.
During the period of nearly four months that
defendant held plaintiff's goods stored in its
warehouse in Dallas, it held them as a warehouse^
man, not as a carrier, and hence its liability must
16
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be determined under the law of bailments. This
rule is stated in 9 AmJur, Carriers, § 687; " . . .
The authorities are in harmony in holding that
when goods have arrived at their destination, and
at the request and for the convenience of the consignee are allowed to remain in the custody of
the carrier, its liability as an insurer of the goods
thereupon ceases and becomes thereafter ordinarily that of a warehouseman, or depository. .. ."
93 Corpus Juris Secundum, Warehousemen and Safe
Depositories, § 2, page 397, makes further distinction
and reference as to the status of a warehouseman wherein he transportsg 0 odsK states:
c. Distinctions
A person who receives goods under a contract
which constitutes him a warehouseman is not
transformed into a common carrier by reason of
undertaking to transport the goods to his warehouse.
Since a warehouseman is of a class of bailees
known as paid agents, exercising private employments whose liability and relation are essentially
different from those of a common carrier, where
a person receives goods under a contract which
constitutes him a warehouseman, as discussed
supra Sec. 1, he is not transformed into a common
carrier by reason of his undertaking to transport
the goods to his warehouse, or to forward the
goods by direction of the owner; and on the other
hand, a carrier which stores goods merely as incidental to the transportation thereof is not a warehouse, although by reason of its acts, the carrier
may, in some circumstances be held to the liability
of a warehouseman, as discussed in Carriers, Sec.
16, 157, 884. Where a warehouseman who is also
a common carrier, on termination of the storage
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contract undertakes to deliver the goods, he assumes the relation of a common carrier from the
time of the acceptance of the order for transportation. (Emphasis added)
Applying the foregoing to the relationship between
Westinghouse and the defendant, we find that the defendant in the course of his dealings with all his customers holds himself out as a warehouseman at certain
points and for those customers for whom he delivers
during the course of delivery holds himself out as a common carrier. As separate charges for storage and transportation were made, and as the goods where not delivered until request of the ultimate consignee, to whom
they were to be delivered by the defendant, and as Westinghouse's goods were in storage at the time of the fire,
and they were not in the process of delivering to the
ultimate consignees, defendant's status is one of warehouseman and not carrier, and that the trial court acted
properly in determining the same and properly instructed the jury as to the standard of care attached to- a warehouseman for the protection of the goods stored in his
Warehouse.
The appellant in Point II, of the Argument portion
of his brief indicates that Westinghouse's claim for common carrier status is equal to or better than Eldredge
for whom the trial court granted summary judgment
against the defendant. The record indicates that the
normal fashion of proceeding between the defendant and
the plaintiff, Eldredge Furniture Company, Inc., was
that the defendant would generally deliver those goods
as they arrived in his warehouse without contacting the
18
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plaintiff Eldredge (R. 251). In the case of Eldredge,
the delivery except with big orders was immediate and
most certainly substantially different than the relationship between Westinghouse and the defendant. Both
Mr. Whittemore and Mr. Emmel testified that no goods
were delivered for Westinghouse to the ultimate consignees until such time as the consignees had been contacted and had indicated a willingness to accept the
goods at a specified time.
Applying the Eldredge relationship to the two criteria for a carrier relationship attaching, to wit: immediate transportation and carrier's convenience, we
find that the defendant generally immediately transported the goods to plaintiff Eldredge and that generally
there were no delays in the transportation. With Westinghouse the goods were not placed for immediate transportation, but for transportation when the consignees
could accept the same and the delay was not for the defendant's convenience but rather for the convenience of
the consignee.
Both plaintiff Westinghouse and the defendant Emmel considered the arrangement between them to be one
for storage and for transfer and that at the time of the
fire, the goods were in storage and not in transfer and
the legal status of warehouseman, as opposed to carrier,
attached to the defendant.
POINT I I
THE DEFENDANT AS A BAILEE/WAREHOUSEMAN SUSTAINED HIS BURDEN
THAT THE FIRE WAS NOT DUE TO HIS
NEGLIGENCE.
19
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The case with respect to all plaintiffs, with the exception of Eldredge Furniture Company, Inc., for whom
summary judgment was granted against the defendant,
was submitted to the jury under the theory of bailor/
bailee relationship (warehouseman for hire) under appropriate instructions. The jury was given a special verdict wherein they were to answer the following question:
Was the defendant, William Emmel, free from
negligence in the operation of his warehouse?
The jury was to answer either "yes" or "no". The
jury on its special verdict answered "yes" finding that
the defendant was free from negligence in the operation
of his warehouse (R. 27).
The question of defendant's negligence and whether
or not he conducted himself in a manner constituting
negligence or not constituting negligence was certainly
a question for the jury, and the trial court properly submitted the issue to them.
The trial court properly submitted the case to the
jury under instructions stating that the burden of nonpersuasion, or the burden of proof was with the defendant as opposed to the normal course where the burden
of proof is upon the plaintiff. The cases cited on page
25 of appellants' brief indicate that the defendant has
the burden of proof and the trial court so instructed the
jury. In instruction No. 7 (R. 62), the court instructed
the jury that the party on whom the burden of proof
rests must sustaip their burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and that if the pftrty upoii whom
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;he burden of proof fails to meet the burden or if the
evidence is evenly balanced the jury must find that the
burden has not been met and rule against the party having the burden of proof. In instruction No. 10 (R. 86),
the t r i a l court, in line with Utah decisions on bailment,
properly instructed the jury that where a bailment situation arises as in the case before them, the bailee or warehouseman has the burden of proof by a preponderance
that the warehouseman did exercise the degree of care
required to protect the bailor's property.
The trial court did not submit the issue of proximate cause to the jury, but held that the inference raised
under the bailor/bailee relationship carries with it the
inference of proximate cause with the inference of negligence, thus placing a greater burden upon the defendant
than perhaps required under the current Utah Supreme
Court cases covering bailment.
In this case, as in all bailment cases in Utah, the
risk of ndnpersuasion falls to the defendant, and the
plaintiff has no reason to complain for the instructions
3n the law of this State concerning bailment, as given
to the jury.
POINT III.
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO
HAVE A FULL-TIME SECURITY GUARD
OR AN AUTOMATIC SPRINKLING SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION.
The appellants suggest to the Court that the fact
that there was no sprinkling system on the premises, that
there were no full-time security guards and the premises

m
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were without inspection for three days, constitute negligence as a matter of law.
The respondent submits that these are issues to be
considered by the jury in their deliberations as to whether or not the defendant/warehouseman was free from
negligence in the operation of his warehouse and not an
issue which is to be decided as a matter of law. Certainly, reasonable minds could differ as to whether or
not under certain circumstances automatic systems are
advisable or whether security guards are required.
Whether or not the defendant went to the warehouse
to make inspections during the course of the three days
seems to have little relevancy. Had he gone on Saturday or Sunday, the fire was not in progress and unless
he was fortunate enough to happen to be on the premises
on July 24, 1972, a few hours before 10:45 when the fire
apparently was under way, an inspection during the
three day period by the defendant would have been meaningless.
On page 24 of appellants' brief, in addition to the
complaints that there were no security guards and no
sprinkling system, the appellants complain that the defendant left his warehouse for three days knowing that
it was full of expensive combustible material belonging
to bailors for hire. The record does not reflect that that
evidence as such was ever before the court. Certainly
the materials stored in his warehouse were combustible
as is all material, but it was not extremely flammable
and there were no extremely flammable items stored in
the warehouse.
22
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There was also no evidence in the record that the
varehouse at 736 West on 3rd South is remotely located
md the street upon which Mr. Enamel's warehouse is
ocated most certainly is a through street running beween 4th South and 3rd South at approximately 736
i^est. Appellants complain that there were no signs on
he premises and that there was difficulty in finding who
>wned the premises, appears to be completely irrelevant
o the issue of negligence unless the appellant feel that
he defendant could have more properly responded to
he fire than the fire department itself. The same reaoning applies to the location of the defendant's address
md the fact that it was 20 minutes from the warehouse.
The fact that the defendant did not have a sprinting system, and the fact that he had no full-time security
guards, and the fact that he was not on the premises for
hree days prior to the fire, over the long week-end, do
>ot constitute negligence as a matter of law. Numerous
urisdictions hold that a warehouseman who does not
ave a sprinkling system or a night watchman is not
egligent as a matter of law and that those elements are
actors to be taken into account by a jury in determining
whether or not negligence exists.
. Bepresentative of those well reasoned cases art
lipps vs. Heming, 167 Colo. 358, 447 P2d 700 (1968).
^aintiff Hipps was an appliance retailer who appealed
rom a judgment in favor of the defendant Henning, a
warehouseman, where plaintiff's goods had been damged and otherwise lost in a warehouse fire at defendnt's place of business. The trial court founds that there
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was a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant and to rebut that presumption, the defendant
produced testimony that the warehouse was old, but in
good condition; that the wiring which was hung from the
ceiling had been removed and new fixtures had been
installed, and most of the wooden floor had been covered
by four inches of reinforced concrete. The defendant
also produced evidence that there were 16 soda ash fire
extinguishers in the building, all of which had been
charged within six or eight months prior to the fire.
Testimony further showed that the building was kept
clear of debris and rubbish and the fire inspector testified
that they found no fault with the condition and operation
of the warehouse so far as a fire hazard was concerned.
The plaintiff argued on appeal that some of the
findings of the trial court should have been as a matter
of law. Plaintiff pointed out that the trial court found
that the warehouse was operated in an old remodeled
building and there was neither a night watchman nor
automatic fire prevention equipment, and that there was
no one on duty at all time to operate the existing manual
equipment.
The Colorado Supreme Court stated that they could
not, as a matter of law, state that all warehousemen must
employ a night watchman, or put in an automatic sprinkler system and that the failure to do so subjects the
warehouseman as a matter of law to liability for any
fire which occurs on the premises.
The Colorado Supreme Court in the same case applied the same rule as has the Utah Supreme Court hold24
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ng that issues of negligence and proximate cause are
o be resolved by the trier of fact, and that only in the
dearest cases, and where reasonable minds could only
Iraw but one inference from the facts, can the appellate
lourt reach a conclusion from that reached by the trier
>f facts as to what constitutes reasonable care. See Gibbs
is. Blue Cab Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P2d 213 (1952).
Also representative of the portion that the question
>f a warehouseman's negligence is one for the trier of
act and that failure to have a night watchman is not
Legligence as a matter of law is Cole vs. Younger, 58
tfM 211, 269 P2d 1096 (1954). In that case, the owner of
Lousehold goods brought suit against a warehouseman
or the loss of the household goods which were destroyed
n a fire of unknown origin. The trial court directed a
erdict for the warehouseman; the plaintiff appealed.
Lmong other things, the New Mexico Supreme Court
teld that the warehouseman had the burden of proof and
hat there was sufficient evidence to establish that the
warehouseman had exercised that degree of care, Havag determined that the burden of proof was on, the wareouseman to prove due care, the New Mexico Supreme
?ourt noted that the warehouseman introduced testilony to show, among other things, that there was no
debris or accumulation of waste of any kind around the
•remises, that the building was of corrugated iron and
letal frame and that the inspection of the fire chief
howed the goods to have been properly stored insofar
.s the official could determine. The evidence showed
hat there was no night watchman as such. The Court
tated that the defendant was not required to show the
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cause of the fire, it was difficult to conceive of other proof
that might be demanded of a defendant to sustain his
burden of proof. The Court concluded that the defendant had successfully carried the burden of proof on the
issue of due care and as there was no evidence of any
sort to the contrary, and the trial court was proper in
directing a verdict on behalf of the warehouseman against
plaintiff.
The following jurisdictions have determined that
the failure to have an automatic sprinkling system or a
night watchman do not constitute negligence as a matter
of law. Bellows vs. Worche-ster Storage Company, 297
Mass. 188, 7 N.E. 2d 588 (1937); Jordan vs. Federal Compress and Warehouse Company, 156 Miss. 514, 216 So.
31 (1930); Gutknecht vs. Wagner Brothers Moving and
Storage Company, 266 S.W. 2d 19. (Mo. 1954); Fry vs.
Wagner Brothers Moving and Storage Company, 267
S.W. 2d 359 (Mo. 1954); Niagra Fire Insurance Company vs. Dodd River Boat Service, Inc., 187 F.Supp. 528
(D.C. Ala., 1960).
It was noted in Brown vs. Sloan Moving & Storage,
296 S.W. 2d 20 (Mo. 1956), that the damage by water
from an automatic sprinkler system to household goods
outweighed the protection which a sprinkler might provide against fire. The record indicates that the defendant, Mr. Emmel, had that consideration in mind when
determining whether or not to install a sprinkler system
in his own warehouse (E. 243).
The fire department inspector, Dean Oallister, testified that the building was constructed generally of con26
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rete, that the interior walls were concrete block as well
s the exterior walls, that the beams were of steel and
rood (R. 204), and that the construction was generally
1 line with other warehouses in the area (R. 207). There
r
ere routine yearly inspections (R. 206) in which proper
tacking was looked for by fire department inspectors,
/iring, furnaces, and trash accumulation as well as
lammable liquids were looked for (R. 214), and that in
lese inspections the items which might lead to fire
az-ard were all in order (R. 215). The fire department
lvestigator concluded that the maintenance and upkeep
f the building was not a cause of the fire (R.211).
The defendant himself testified that the building was
ibstantially constructed of concrete or concrete block
R. 232); that there were no flammable materials stored
a the premises (R. 234); that the skylights were of a
)ft green plexiglass (R. 235); that there were trash
mtainers for the limited amount of trash that was acimulated in the warehouse and that it was swept every
ay (R. 237); that there were no incinerators around
Le warehouse (R, 237); that there were no prior fires
L the warehouse to the defendant's knowledge (R. 238);
tat he had had no electrical problems; and, that his
3ods were stacked away from the electrical conduit conlining the electrical wiring (R. 239 & 241). The demdant also maintained fire extinguishers in the buildig (R. 241), and he prevented smoking in the warehouse
:ea proper (R. 243).
Mr. Enamel, as well as his foremen, George Bartlett,
istified concerning the precautions taken by other ware-
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houses throughout the area. Mr. Emmel noted that
sprinklers are not standard in all warehouses (E. 243),
and he was familiar with other warehouses that did not
maintain full-time security guards (K. 244).
The plaintiffs attempted at various stages through
the proceedings to try and link the defendant or his employees to the improvised fuse link contained in the main
switch box, but were unsuccessful. Plaintiffs' attempts
to show that the fuse caused the fire were unsuccessful
especially in view of the fact that the defendant produced
an electrical engineer who testified under the facts of
the case as supplied to him in defendant's counsel's hypothetical question which was based upon the testimony
from Mr. Emmel concerning the status of the warehouse
prior to the fire, that electricity or any electrical failure
was not the cause of the fire, but that an electrical failure
occurred because of the fire. Plaintiff's contention that
no evidence was presented by the defendant to exclude
the suspected electrical causes of the fire or negligence
therewith is in error.
The record, with the exception of defendant's electrical expert who testified to the contrary, is devoid of
any assertions by any of the witnesses, including plaintiffs' electrical expert, the city electrical inspector and
the Salt Lake City Fire Department Inspector that the
fire was a result of an electrical failure. The cause of the
fire was undetermined.
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Defendant's action in maintaining his warehouse in
le manner in which he so did, including what fire preention devices he may have provided or failed to proide constitute a jury question and was properly subdtted to the jury and there is no compelling fact upon
hich reasonable minds cannot differ that should require
lis Court to hold, as a matter of law, that the defendant
as negligent in the operation of his warehouse.

POINT IV.
A WAREHOUSEMAN IS ONLY LIABLE
FOR DAMAGES FOR LOSS OR INJURY TO
GOODS WHERE HE HAS FAILED TO EXERCISE A DEGREE OF CARE IN REGARD
TO THOSE GOODS AS A REASONABLY
CAREFUL MAN WOULD UNDER LIKE
CIRCUMSTANCES.
The standard of care required of a warehouseman
one of ordinary care, or the same care that a reason)ly -careful owner of similar goods would provide,
arious jurisdictions throughout the country, including
tah, generally apply the standard of ordinary care to
warehouseman for the protection of goods stored. A
ineral statement of the law is found in 56 AmJur § 128
ige 379, which provides:
LOSS DUE TO NEGLIGENCE OF A WAREHOUSEMAN. A warehouseman is required to
exercise due care or a reasonable degree of prudence for the protection and preservation of
goods stored with him, and is liable for a loss
• : or an injury for a failure to exercise such care.
Indeed, even if the loss is due to an act of God,
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if the negligence of a warehouseman commingles
with and operates as a contributive element, proximate to the injury, the warehouseman is liable.
In this regard, due or reasonable care has been
defined as that degree of care which a reasonably
careful person would exercise under similar circumstances with respect to similar property owned by himself, or, according to some statements,
which reasonably prudent warehousemen are accustomed to exercise under similar circumstances.
The State of Utah has adopted by statute a similar
standard at 70A-7-204, Utah Code Annotated 1953, As
Amended. This provision of the Uniform Commercial
Code sets out the standard of care required by a warehouseman as follows:
DUTY OF CAKE — Contractual limitation of
warehouse man's liability. - (1) A warehouseman
is liable for damages for loss of or injury to the
goods caused by his failure to exercise such care
in regard to them as a reasonably careful man
would exercise under like circumstances, but unless
otherwise agreed, he is not liable for damages
which could not have been avoided by the exercise
of such care.
The defendant, by his own testimony, concerning the
manner of operation and construction of the warehouse,
through the testimony of his foreman, Grant Bartlett,
concerning the procedures and operation of similar warehouses throughout the area, and the testimony of the
fire inspector, Dean Callister, that the warehouse met
the requirements of the fire department and that prior
inspections revealed no hazards, all went to show that
the defendant operated his warehouse in a manner which
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as in conformation with the duty of care imposed upon
im both by statute and common law. There was no evi3nce from the plaintiffs that the manner in which the
arehouse was operated, maintained, or constructed was
ss 'than the standard of care required of the defendant.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, William Emmel, submits that the
ial court properly found that no relationship of comon carrier existed between the defendant and Westghouse under the facts elicited from the testimony of
e parties and did not err in sending Westinghouse's
aim against the defendant to the jury.
On the issue of negligence, the trial court properly
Lbmitted those issues to the jury as a question of fact
hose finding that the defendant was free from neglimce in the operation of his warehouse was fully sup•rted by the evidence.
Respectfully Submitted,
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
HANSON, WADSWORTH & RUSSON
Attorney for Respondent
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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